Career background and voting behaviour in the European Parliament by Koelewijn, Colin
UNIVERSITEIT LEIDEN 
Career Background and Voting 
Behaviour in the European 
Parliament 
Author: 
Koelewijn, C.J. 
s1256343 
6/9/2016 
Supervisor: 
Louwerse, T.P. 
 
  
 
This bachelor-thesis deals with the question to what extent the career background of parliamentarians 
affects their voting. This is studied within the context of one of the most diverse parliaments: the 
European Parliament. Although both topics have already enjoyed some scholarly attention, the causal 
relationship between career background and voting behaviour has not been studied yet. In determining 
the extent in which career background affects how parliamentarians vote, it is important to not only 
look at whether MEPs vote, but also at how career background influences what is actually voted. This 
study is unique in the sense that it employs a dyadic analysis in order to determine to what extent two 
MEPs vote together. On the basis of both the participation- and dyadic analysis, this study finds that 
career background significantly affects voting behaviour through both voting participation and the 
actual content of the votes.  
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1. Introduction  
More often than not, parliamentarians are ambitious. While ambition is almost a necessary trait 
for an individual to become a legislator, parliamentarians are different when it comes to their 
background career paths (Scarrow, 1997). This is a subject that has already enjoyed scholarly 
interest over the last decades, of which most of the research on careers in legislatures was done 
with respect to national legislatures (Schlesinger, 1966; Poole & Rosenthal, 1991; Kiewiet & 
Zeng, 1993; Epstein, Brady, Kawato & O’Halloran, 1997; Samuels, 2003; Kellermann & 
Shepsle, 2009). However, since those studies are conducted with regard to a single country, the 
possible variation in career-oriented behaviour is fairly limited (Meserve, Pemstein & Bernhard, 
2009). This thesis, on the other hand, deals with careers in the context of the European 
Parliament (EP). Within the context of political behaviour and legislative politics, the EP has 
already been frequently studied, but the research on career behaviour within this legislative body 
is still far from complete (Hix & Høyland, 2014). For the most part, research on the careers 
within the EP are primarily of a descriptive nature (Scarrow, 1997). Thus far, there has only been 
one extensive study, by Daniel (2015), that goes beyond describing the backgrounds and 
ambitions of Members of European Parliament (MEPs), focusing on the interplay between 
institutions and careers. His study shows that increases in institutional power increase re-election 
seeking and indicates that a higher education level increases the odds of rapporteurship and 
commission appointment (Daniel, 2015).  
This thesis aims to go beyond merely describing the background and characteristics of 
parliamentarians and expand on how and to what extent one’s career affects parliamentary 
behaviour. While Daniel (2015) indicated that career background has an effect on some forms of 
parliamentary behaviour, there are other important types of behaviour within a legislature which 
could further justify research on political career backgrounds. One of the most concrete and 
measureable forms of parliamentary behaviour is the act of voting. It determines whether or not 
legislation passes and more importantly serves as a concrete means of political expression (Poole 
& Rosenthal, 2000). Should career background influence voting behaviour, it may also prove 
influential in many other types of political behaviour.  
In order to contribute towards the knowledge of the effect of careers on legislative 
behaviour in the context of the EP, my research question is: 
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To what extent does career background affect how parliamentarians vote in the European 
Parliament? 
This research question is studied drawing on the career types and roll-call vote behaviour 
of the MEPs between 2004 and 2009. This is done using two inherently different analyses. The 
first analysis concerns with the extent in which career background affects the voting-
participation in the EP using an Ordinary Least Squares -based linear regression. In determining 
the extent in which career background affects how parliamentarians vote, it is important to not 
only look at whether MEPs vote, but also at how career background influences the actual vote. 
This study is unique in the sense that it employs a dyadic analysis in order to determine to what 
extent two MEPs vote together. This is done by taking all possible pairs of MEPs and using a 
multilevel mixed linear regression.  
2. Theory  
When it comes to career backgrounds, I will partially draw on the typology of career 
backgrounds of Susan Scarrow (1997). In her research, Scarrow identified three different types 
of MEPs concerning their career background: 1) MEPs who are on a political dead-end. They 
consider the EP as a retirement home after their service within their national parliament. 2) 
MEPs that pursue a national career. They consider the EP as a stepping stone, where an 
individual can build a name within the EP to run for national office. 3) MEPs that pursue a 
European career. They consider the EP as their main arena and want to further their careers 
within the European Union. This typology is used because it represents the varying “faces” of the 
parliament itself, due to the incorporation of both career path and ambition (Daniel, 2015).  
In order to determine the extent in which career background has impact on voting 
behaviour, it is also important to define voting behaviour by elaborating on the behaviour itself 
and which type of votes are considered. In general, there are two types of voting behaviour 
which could be affected by the career background of an MEP. The first type concerns with the 
participation: whether or not an MEP actually casts a vote. The second type of voting behaviour 
concerns with the way in which the MEP votes, which can be determined by looking at the 
extent in which pairs of MEPs vote the same. 
When it comes to the votes considered, the EP generally meets plenary session 
approximately sixteen times a year, of which twelve times in Strasbourg and four times in 
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Brussels. During each session, there are at least hundreds of votes, ranging from amendments to 
paragraphs to complete resolutions. In general, there are three methods of voting: a show of 
hands, an electronical vote without individual vote registration and a so call roll-call vote with 
individual vote registration (Hix, 2002). Within the context of this thesis, I will draw on these 
roll-call votes, since they offer the possibility to analyze the registered votes of the individual 
MEPs. However, there is a downside when it comes to drawing on roll-call votes. This voting 
method is only used when either a European Party Group (EPG), or a group of at least thirty-two 
MEPs request it (Carrubba et al., 2006). Since most of the roll-call votes are requested by EPGs 
for monitoring and signaling purposes, the subset of votes used in this thesis is not only non-
random, but possibly also biased (Carrubba et al., 2006). Whilst this selection effect may result 
in possible over-estimations of the possible relationships between career background and voting 
behaviour, this should not hinder this study in using roll-call votes. According to Carrubba et al., 
(2006), they are not inherently flawed, especially in a context where EPG is controlled for. 
An important theoretical argument in favour of career background affecting voting 
participation stems from the established literature on ambition in legislatures. Within this thesis 
is assumed that career development is one of the most rational individual calculations which 
implicates that parliamentary behaviour is motivated by the desire to achieve individual career 
goals (Schlesinger, 1966; Samuels, 2003; Daniel, 2015). When it comes to parliamentary 
behaviour, this assumption is supported by multiple legislative studies. Drawing mostly on 
research done on US legislatures, Barber (1965) and Ehrenhalt (1992) showed that individuals 
who aspire long legislative service are often more dedicated and thus more active and effective 
within the institutions wherein they operate. This indicates that there is a belief amongst 
parliamentarians that parliamentary activity, also in the form of voting-participation, can be used 
as a means to achieve personal career goals. Within the context of the EP, this assumption also 
seems to hold, since there is evidence that saliency and participation within the EP might 
partially be explained by the careers of MEPs (Scully, 2005; Hoyland, Hobolt & Hix, 2014).  
Within the context of the earlier mentioned categories on career background, we could 
therefore hypothesize that the respective career type of an MEP affects whether or not he or she 
participates in a vote. MEPs who consider the EP as their main arena and want to further their 
careers within the European Union are more likely to vote than MEPs who consider the EP as a 
retirement home. Conversely, MEPs who consider the EP as a retirement home, are less likely to 
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participate in votes than MEPs with other career backgrounds, since that group of MEPs likely 
do not aspire legislative service anymore, after a lengthy political career.  This expectation is due 
to the earlier mentioned evidence of the partial explanatory power of MEP careers on saliency 
and participation. Therefore, the following two hypotheses on the effect of career background on 
voting participation arise: 
H1: European careerists are more likely to participate in parliamentary votes than MEPs that 
consider the EP as either a stepping stone or retirement home.  
H2: MEPs that consider the EP to be a retirement home are less likely to participate in 
parliamentary votes than MEPs that consider the EP as either a stepping stone or main political 
arena. 
When studying the impact of career background on the way in which an MEP votes, it is 
important to keep in mind that there are three established significant indicators for how MEPs 
vote within the EP. There has already been extensive research on the drivers of how MEPs vote 
within the EP, which Hix and Høyland (2014) already extensively summarized in their chapter 
on Political Behaviour in the EP. The three known (significant) indicators, in order of 
importance, are: 1) The ideological left-right preferences of the MEP (Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999; 
Thomassen et al, 2004; Hix et al, 2006; Han, 2007; Hix and Noury, 2009; Scully et al, 2012). 2) 
The National party stance (Hix, 2002; Kreppel, 2002; Lindstäd, Slapin & Van der Wielen, 2012). 
3) The stance of the European political group to which the MEP belongs (Hix & Høyland, 2014; 
Hix, 2002; Kreppel, 2002).  
Whilst the link between career background and what an MEP votes has not been directly 
studied yet, Farrell (2003) and Scully (2005) already showed that length of service hardly has 
any effect on how pro-European an MEP is. It is also indicated by Scully and Farrell (2003) that 
the length of service in the EP has little effect on views on European reforms and increasing the 
powers of the EU as a whole. This research might suggest that the career background of an MEP 
is not that significant of an indicator for voting behaviour, since it seems that career background 
does not significantly shape preferences on the basis of the research of both Scully (2005) and 
Farrell (2003).  
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However, within the current conceptualization of career background, there are still 
theoretical arguments in favour of career background affecting the extent in which pairs of MEPs 
vote the same. Length of tenure is only in part a criterion for what the career background of an 
MEP is. More important in determining one’s career background are the ambition and attitudes 
of an MEP (Scarrow, 1997). In other words, the fact that research indicates that length of tenure 
does not affect views on the power of EU institutions cannot simply be generalized for the effect 
of career background on views on European integration and EP power. Especially since the 
before mentioned studies by Scully (2005) and Farrel (2003) did not incorporate career ambition, 
which can be assumed as one of the intrinsic driver for legislative behaviour (Herrick & Moore, 
1993; Daniel, 2015). Following that assumption, a European careerist would be more likely to 
vote in favour of pushing further European integration and increasing the power of the EP. 
Especially since the MEP in this category has the ambition of developing their entire career 
within this institution. The assumption of career ambition being an intrinsic driver for legislative 
behaviour can also be applied to domestic careerists and MEPs that consider the EP to be a 
political dead-end. Those who want to pursue a political career in their own country, would 
likely not want to push European integration and greater EP power, whilst MEPs that consider 
the EP to be their retirement home are likely to be more indifferent in that regard. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis on the effect of career background on voting behaviour arise: 
H3: MEPs with similar career backgrounds are more likely to vote alongside each other. 
3. Case selection 
When it comes to case selection, I am primarily interested in the EP as a venue for studying the 
extent in which career background affects how parliamentarians vote. As already briefly 
mentioned in the introduction, the possible variation in career-oriented behaviour in most 
national legislatures is fairly limited, especially when compared to a powerful multi-level 
parliamentary assembly such as the EP (Meserve, Pemstein & Bernhard, 2009). The possible 
variation of career-oriented behaviour in the EP is greater due to the large diversity in the 
background of the parliamentarians: the EP contains 751 parliamentarians coming from hundreds 
of national political parties from across 28 different countries (Daniel, 2015). Besides, all these 
parliamentarians do not primarily work together with their national delegation, but within a 
transnational EPG, which are primarily formed along ideological lines (Daniel, 2015). Combined 
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with its growing power and importance, this makes the EP a unique venue for studying 
legislative career paths and their impacts.  
 While several international parliamentary assemblies might share some of these 
attributes, the increasing power of the EP is important, due to the fact that there would be less 
diversity in terms of career paths and ambitions. The prevalence of MPs who hold a main interest 
in the legislature would most likely be significantly lower.  
On the practical side, the EP has already received a significant amount of scholarly 
attention over the last couple of decades. The great benefit hereof is the abundance in data 
concerning the parliamentarians: both on their backgrounds as their legislative behaviour. This 
makes it possible for me to gather data on ambitions, length of tenure and roll-call voting data 
(amongst other important variables which will be detailed in the next section). 
4. Research design, operationalization & methods of data collection 
This study utilizes a quantitative approach in order to test the hypotheses and finally answer the 
research question. The hypotheses are tested using secondary, publicly available, data using both 
and an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) -based Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) model for 
testing the two participation-related hypotheses and a linear mixed model for testing the dyadic 
voting similarity hypothesis. Within this section, we elaborate on the methods of data collection 
and the concepts of interest for this study are operationalized into variables. For the dependent-, 
independent- and control-variables, the operationalization differs between the variables 
employed in the participation and dyadic analysis. For the participation analysis, the level of 
analysis is the individual MEP, whilst the level of analysis for the dyadic analysis is the pair of 
two MEPs. In other words: the variables used in the participation analysis are characteristics of 
an MEP, and the variables used in the dyadic analysis reflect the similarities and/or differences 
between two MEPs. 
4.1. Dependent variables 
To test the hypotheses, I draw on the extensive data on roll-call votes collected by Hix, Noury 
and Roland (2009) as part of the “How MEPs Vote” project. For the purpose of this study, 
drawing on the data concerning the sixth round (2004-2009) of the EP should be sufficient to 
ensure a large enough sample size in order to performs a statistical analysis on the extent to 
which MEPs within the same career type vote alongside each other. This dataset consists of 6200 
roll-call votes. Furthermore, the 6
th
 round of the EP is also the most recent round on which there 
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are clean public roll-call vote data. There are four voting outcomes within the data: yes, no, 
abstain or no attendance.  
 In order to determine whether European careerists are more likely and political dead-end 
MEPs are less likely to participate in parliamentary votes, it is necessary to create a single 
dependent variable that represents the extent of voting participation. For the first and second 
hypothesis, the three basic voting decisions, yes, no and abstain, are coded as 1, participation, 
whilst the non-participatory outcomes are coded as 0. This variable is referred to as 
Participationn, where n identifies which Roll-Call Vote the vote was casted for. There are 6200 
roll-call votes in this dataset as Participationn where 1 ≤ n ≤ 6200, with values of either 0 or 1. 
Since a single dependent variable is preferred, all Participationn variables are transformed into 
the variable Participation %, by adding all Participationn variables, and dividing it by the 
number of roll-call votes (6200) multiplied by 100%. This variable thus resembles the percentage 
of EP6 votes in which an MEP participated and can be used as the dependent variable for the 
participation analysis. 
Figure 1: Distribution of Roll-Call Vote Participation across MEPs in EP6 
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 As illustrated in figure 1, most MEPs participate in roughly 75% to 95% of the roll-call 
votes and on average MEPs tend to participate in 66,56 percent of the roll-call votes, with a 95 
percent confidence interval between 64,85 and 68,27 percent.  
 For testing my third hypothesis, I will entirely focus on the three basic voting outcomes 
(yes, no or abstain) and consider the fourth possible outcome of non-participation as missing. 
This list of variables is referred to as Roll-Call Votei, where i identifies which roll-call vote the 
vote was casted for. In order to measure the voting similarity, Roll-Call Vote has to be 
transformed into a variable that is compatible with a dyadic analysis. This new dependent 
variable will be the percentage of matching votes of both MEPs within the same dyad. This 
variable is from here on referred to as Vote Match. The variable Vote Match captures the 
percentage of votes in which two MEPs voted the same out of the total number of votes they 
both participated in.  
 Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of Vote Match and shows that, on average, MEPs tend 
to vote alongside each other in 42,41 percent of the votes.   
Figure 2: Distribution of Vote Match across all MEP pairs in EP6 
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4.2. Independent variables 
The career background classification is based on both length of service and post-EP career 
outcomes, which are to a great extent measureable. Patterns of both these variables can be both 
revealing and theorized into having a causal relations with legislative behaviour, and more 
specifically: voting behaviour. Other classifications, such as Westlake’s (1994) framework of six 
stereotypes, also draw on both length of tenure and career outcomes. However, such 
classifications require more extensive information on the individual parliamentarians on for 
example attitude and biography. The added value of such detailed frameworks will most likely 
hardly alter the theoretical argument in this thesis, whilst requiring a significant amount of 
additional time and effort. 
 The data required for realizing this classification comes from the research done by Daniel 
(2015). His dataset on all the MEPs ranging from EP1 through EP7 contain both length of tenure 
(seniority) as Post-EP career ambitions (outcome), which are necessary for categorizing the 
MEPs. The length of tenure is operationalized as the number of EP waves an MEP has been 
elected in. For this research, I can use the "outcome" variable from Daniel (2015), where the 
possible career outcomes of MEPs during the period of 1979-2009 were coded as followed: 
0=retire/leave political life, 1=national executive (local, sub-national or national level), 2=EU 
institution (not EP), 3=national legislature (local, sub-national, or national), 4=re-election to the 
EP (Daniel 2015). It is drawn from publicly available information regarding an MEP's desired 
career outcome, directly following the conclusion of the current wave of the EP. From his 
dataset, I will exclusively draw from the MEPs active in the 6
th
 wave of the EP.  
This variable is referred to as Career Type and represents the independent variable for the 
participation analysis. The categorization of career background is based on the following criteria: 
1. Political dead-end: Satisfying outcome 0 and seniority 1. 
2. Domestic careerist:  Satisfying outcome 1 or 3 and seniority 1 or 2. 
3. European careerist  Satisfying outcome 2 or 4 and seniority 2 or higher. 
The use of length of tenure is essential within this classification in order to add substance to 
the ambition. For example, you can’t be considered a domestic careerist if you state the ambition, 
but are meanwhile participating in your 3
rd
 or 4
th
 EP-wave. Another example is the classification 
of political dead-end: would an MEP state he would like to retire, it is essential to utilize his 
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length of tenure. An MEP that has the ambition to retire, but has already served in the EP for 
over a couple of EP-waves, is unlikely to fall into the category of MEPs that view the EP as a 
retirement home. Hence the requirement of a value of 1 of the seniority variable. 
Table 1: Career Types of MEPs in EP6 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Career Type Political dead-end 120 13,7 28,0 
Domestic careerist 137 15,6 31,9 
European careerist 172 19,6 40,1 
Total 429 49,0 100,0 
Missing  447 51,0  
Total 876 100,0  
 
As seen in table 1, this particular operationalization of career background is able to 
classify 49 percent of the MEPs within the 6
th
 wave of the EP. The European careerist type is the 
one most represented within EP6, followed by domestic careerists and finally MEPs that 
consider the EP to be their retirement home. Since Scarrow (1997) primarily focused on the four 
biggest countries within the European Union, it is unfortunately not possible to directly compare 
these outcomes and signal a trend. However, assuming that the career backgrounds of the MEPs 
countries studied by Scarrow (1997) could be generalized, we do see a 3 percent increase in the 
amount of European careerists, a 9 percent increase in domestic careerists and a 10 decrease of 
MEPs that consider the EP to be a retirement home between EP4 and EP6. 
 As with the dependent variables, the independent variable has to be transformed into an 
independent variable which says something about the pair of MEPs, instead of the individual 
MEP. The independent variable used would be whether the career background matches or not. 
Table 2: Career Type Match of MEPs in EP6    
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Career Type Match No match 60644 15,8 48,9 
Match 63436 16,6 51,1 
Total 124080 32,4 100,0 
Missing  259170 67,6  
Total 383250 100,0  
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This variable is from here on referred to as Career Type Match. It is a dichotomous variable: 
with the possible values of 0 or 1. Career Type Match equals 1 when two MEPs have the same 
career type classification and 0 if they do not. If either of them have a missing career type, the 
Career Type Match is also treated as missing. 
The reason for treating Career Type Match as missing, is the fact that it may be possible 
that two MEPs who do not fall within the career categories defined in this thesis still have an 
identical career background. Table 2 shows that for 74 percent of the dyads can be determined 
whether or not there is a match in career background. From the classifiable dyads, 7,7 percent 
have a matching career background, equivalent to 21.846 pairs. 
4.3. Control variables 
When studying the effect of career background on voting behaviour, there are also variables that 
have to be controlled for in order to guarantee internal validity of the findings. Within the 
context of the three career categories and the actual roll-call voting behaviour, there are factors 
which could affect both the placement of an MEP within these categories and the MEP roll-call 
voting behaviour. The data on these control variables are all acquired from the dataset prepared 
by Daniel (2015). The first and most important control variable is the home country of the MEP. 
Both Scarrow (1997) and Daniel (2015) showed that there is a great heterogeneity in the 
background of MEPs related to their home country (Country). Not only might it affect the 
independent variable: it also has the potential to influence the voting behaviour of the MEPs. 
This due to the fact that between countries there are significant differences in political climate 
and national interests and thus differences in voting positions on certain votes. The second 
variable that will be controlled for, is the age of the MEP (Age). It clearly has effect on the 
independent variable, since age correlates with length of tenure. With relation to the dependent 
variable, age might also influence voting patterns due to intergenerational differences in political 
viewpoints. The third control variable is gender, since it could be possible that it affects length of 
tenure, ambition and voting behaviour (Gender). The fourth control variable is the European 
party group of the MEP (EPG). It might very well be possible that some career types are more 
prevalent in some parties, which would represent a party effect rather than a career effect. In 
other words, it influences the voting outcomes and likely correlates with the career background 
due to self-selection effects and thus has to be controlled for. The descriptive statistics of these 
control variables employed can be found in table A1 through A4. 
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 While these control variables are appropriate for the participation analysis, some 
adjustments are needed. Firstly, all the previously discussed control variables have to be 
transformed to resemble characteristics of a dyad. The categorical control variables Country, 
Gender and EPG are transformed into Country Match, Gender Match and EPG Match. These 
dyad specific categorical control variables they equal 1 when two MEPs share the same 
characteristic and 0 if they do not. The continuous control variable Age is transformed into Age 
Difference, which represents the absolute difference in age between two MEPs.  
 Secondly, the dyadic analysis is subject to two variations of a party effect. The first is the 
previously discussed Party Match, which indicates whether two MEPs are member of the same 
EPG. The second party effect does not come from whether two MEPs are member of the same 
EPG, but from asking which European party group the MEPs are member of (Dyadic EPG). The 
Dyadic EPG is 0 when both MEPs do not have a matching party, while the the other values 
represent the actual EPG of which both MEPs are member. The descriptive statistics of the 
dyadic control variables employed can be found in table A5 and A6. 
5. Participation analysis 
In order to test whether European careerists are most likely to participate in parliamentary votes, 
while MEPs that consider the EP to be a retirement home are least likely to participate in 
parliamentary votes, a statistical analysis on the mean differences of vote participation between 
the three career types has to be performed. Since the dependent variable Participation% is 
continuous, the main independent variable is categorical and most of the control variables, aside 
from Age, are categorical as well, either a linear regression or ANCOVA can be employed. Both 
approaches are identical in outcome, since both are general linear models, but using gives the 
opportunity to employ a post-hoc pairwise comparison of mean differences between the three 
career categories.  
The ANCOVA analysis is an extension to the linear regression equation employed within 
a regular ANOVA analysis in order to include covariates. In other words, an ANCOVA is 
essentially the same as a regression analysis with dummy variables and covariates (Field, 2009). 
While a linear regression analysis is more common within political science, the choice for 
ANCOVA is largely motivated by the fact that my main independent variable is categorical and 
that there are a large amount of dummy variables used for testing hypothesis two and three. Due 
to the characteristics of this study and the variables used, the assumptions of independence 
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between the covariate and the independent variables and a lack of interaction between those are 
likely not met. It seems obvious that Age differs within the three career categories: MEPs that are 
considered on a political dead-end are more likely to be older than MEPs from the other 
categories. Fortunately, those two assumptions are of greater concern when it comes to 
experiments, while this an observational study (Keppel, 1991).  
Within this model Country, EPG and Gender represent the three fixed factors, while Age 
represents the covariate. Utilizing these variables ensures that the effect of those variables of 
both our dependent and independent variables are controlled for, further guaranteeing valid 
results.  
According to the Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances, the hypothesis of equal 
variances across groups is rejected with a p-value <0,001. However, since sample sizes are fairly 
equal, the F-test should nonetheless be robust and the ANCOVA can still be used for testing 
whether the mean differences are statistically significant. 
Purely looking at the distribution of Participation % across all three career types, as 
illustrated in figure 3, we can notice a notable difference between the participation rates of the 
European careerists as opposed to those that belong to the other categories. On average, the 
European careerists participate in 79,22 percent of the votes, surpassing the Political dead-end 
MEPs and the Domestic careerists, who on average participate in 59,66 and 41,74 percent of the 
votes, respectively. In contrary to the initial expectation, the Domestic careerists in EP6 seem to 
participate least, but on the basis of figure 3 it is not yet possible to determine whether this 
statements statistically holds. 
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  Figure 3:Distribution of Participation Across the Three Career Types 
 
  
The post-hoc pairwise comparisons of the mean differences between the career categories 
is calculated on the basis of Estimated Marginal Means from the ANCOVA model. By using the 
Estimated Marginal Means, the mean participation percentages for each group are corrected for 
the covariate, Age, in this model. In other words, this method gives the effects of the categories 
adjusted for mean value of the covariate. Figure 6 shows the output of such a comparison. From 
this output follows that all estimated mean differences are statistically significant at the p < 0,001 
level. On average, European careerists show a higher Participation% than the other two 
categories, with the largest mean difference with the Domestic careerist, confirming the earlier 
observations on the basis of figure 3. The Domestic careerist type has the lowest average roll-call 
vote participation, 12,281 percent-points lower than the Political dead-end career type. 
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Table 3: ANCOVA Post-Hoc Pairwise Comparisons of Mean Vote Participation Differences between 
Career Types 
(I) Career Type (J) Career Type Mean Difference (I-J) 
Political dead-end Domestic careerist 12,28*** 
 (2,84) 
European careerist -18,61*** 
  (2,95) 
Domestic careerist Political dead-end -12,28*** 
 (2,84) 
European careerist -30,89*** 
  (2,70) 
European careerist 
 
                                         
Political dead-end 18,61*** 
 (2,95) 
Domestic careerist 30,89*** 
  (2,70) 
Note: Post-Hoc ANCOVA Mean differences, based on estimated marginal means, including the standard errors in between 
brackets. Also includes Sidak correction for multiple comparisons. 
***
p < 0.001, 
**
p < 0.01, 
*
p < 0.05 
6. Dyadic analysis 
In an attempt to test whether MEPs with similar career backgrounds are more likely to vote 
alongside each other, a statistical analysis is required. With this particular hypothesis, it is 
necessary to use a dyadic statistical analysis. While this method is seldom used in this field, not 
only does it increase the number of observations, but the use of dyads also allows for the 
examination of the influence of career background on the extent in which any given pair of 
MEPs vote the same (Reichert, 2001). With such a dyadic analysis, all MEPs are paired with 
each other into dyads. As such, each data-entry would not be an individual MEP, but a paired 
couple of two MEPs. This results in a new, inflated, dataset consisting of 383.250 unique dyads. 
 Within the context of the data analysis, the characteristics of the Vote Match variable 
indicate that a binomial logistic model might be preferred. Given the large size of the dyadic 
dataset, I opt for linear regression for reasons of feasibility. However, two potential problems 
arise for utilizing a linear regression model. First, the dependent variable can only hold values 
between 0 and 100, since it is a percentage. Second, the dataset employed is extremely inflated 
due to the fact that each MEP is paired with all other MEPs, resulting in a dataset where each 
MEP can be observed within 875 dyads. 
Fortunately, figure 1 shows that the data seems to come close to a normal distribution, 
with a mean of 42,41 and a standard deviation of 16,006. This suggests that using a linear 
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regression model in order to estimate the explanatory power of a career type match on the voting 
match  between MEPs would still be possible.  
Since a normal OLS regression would violate the independence of errors assumption 
caused by the pairing of all possible pairs, a linear mixed-effects model will be employed. The 
multilevel aspect of this type of model makes it possible to control for the random effect of the 
dyads by including the identification variables of both MEPs (id_1 and id_2) as random-effect 
variables (Gilardi & Füglister 2008; Field 2009). Within the context of this thesis, the main 
mixed-effects model equation holds: 
 Yijk=(0+ u1,j+ u2,k)+ 1CareerTypeMatchijk + 2CountryMatchijk + 3GenderMatchijk  
+ 
4
PartyMatch
ijk
 + 
5
AgeDifference
ijk
 +εijk 
 The  𝑢1,𝑗 component measures the variability in intercepts due to id_1, where j reflects 
the exact identification number of the first MEP in dyad i. The 𝑢2,𝑘 component does exactly the 
same for id_2, where k reflects the exact identification number of the second MEP in dyad i. 
Besides the main mixed effects model, a second mixed effects model is employed to 
control for possible party-specific effects. Within this second model, the Party Match variable is 
replaced with the EPG variable in order to determine whether and to what extent the findings 
from the main model hold. Party Match is not directly incorporated into the second model due to 
the fact that EPG is not independent of Party Match, since EPG is an extension where instead of 
holding a value of 1 when there is a matching EPG, the value varies between 1 and 8 depending 
on which EPG both MEPs are member of.  
Both models  are roughly equivalent in terms of their explanatory power. The primary 
deviation between both models in terms in terms of their explanatory power is the slightly lower 
residual variance of Model 2 and the ability to gain insight on the party-specific effects. 
However, the effect of particular party-membership on voting similarities latter is outside the 
scope of this study. 
Controlling for country, gender, EPG and the random effects, the output from both Model 
1 and 2, displayed in table A9, reveal that Career Type Match is a statistically significant 
indicator, with a p-value below 0,001, for whether two MEPs vote alongside each other. They 
both show that the prevalence of a matching career type is associated with a nearly identical 
increase of approximately 7,36 percent in voting alongside another MEP. Furthermore, it is 
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notable that, with the exception of the National Conservative EPG, all independent and control 
variables are statistically significant with a p-value below 0,05 and a low standard error (between 
0,01 and 0,95). The effect of matching career types on the similarity of voting outcomes is nearly 
as large as a Country Match in Model 1 (7,93), and even greater than Country Match in Model 2 
(5,61). In other words, dyads consisting of two MEPs that belong to the same EPG are associated 
with the largest increase in the extent to which they vote identically, closely followed by the 
effect of matching countries and career type. Gender has a very small effect of not more than 
0,40 percent and the extent to which the age of two MEPs within a dyad differ, decreases the 
prevalence of matching votes, but only by a very small amount (-0,02 percent per year of 
difference, and an average age difference of 11,45). It is furthermore noteworthy that model 2 
indicates that especially the Greens (30,82) and the Far Left (14,55) are the strongest indicators 
of two MEPs voting identically. This while a matching membership of the Liberals (3,48) and 
National Conservatives (0,95) is responsible for even less identical votes between two MEPs 
than a matching career type.  
The outcomes from the mixed models are in line with the former assumption that a linear 
regression is possible despite the fixed range of the dependent variable. This assumption can be 
verified by calculating some extremely high/low expected values in order to determine whether 
they fall within the 0 to 100 range. For example, MEPs who both match in career type, country, 
gender and are both member of the Green EPG, are expected to vote the same in 76,73 percent 
of the votes according to Model 2 and 56,41 percent according to Model 1. The lowest possible 
expected values of both models can be achieved by a pair of MEPs that do not share country, 
gender and EPG, whilst differing 60 years in age. Such a dyad has an expected voting match of 
31,35 percent for Model 2 and 31,39 percent for Model 1. This illustrates that, considering the 
predictors used, the fixed range of the dependent variable does not pose a problem and allows the 
use of a linear model.  
7. Conclusion & Discussion 
Drawing on both analyses, it is possible to determine to what extent career background affects 
how parliamentarians vote in the EP. When it comes to the effects of career background on 
participation, the outcomes of the ANCOVA strongly indicate that the European careerists are 
indeed more likely to participate in parliamentary roll-call votes than MEPs from the other career 
categories. European careerists participate roughly 30,8 percentage points more than domestic 
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careerists and 18,6 percentage points more than MEPs who consider the EP to be their retirement 
home. However, the second hypothesis has to be rejected. The participation analysis indicates 
that MEPs who are on a political dead-end are more likely to participate in roll-call voting than 
domestic careerists, with a statistically significant difference in average voting participation of 
12,3 percentage points. When it comes to the effects of career background on the extent in which 
MEPs vote the same, the dyadic analysis indicates that there is a significant positive relation 
between the two. According to the linear mixed model, MEPs with similar career backgrounds 
are indeed more likely to vote alongside each other. The effect is, depending on whether model 1 
or 2 is used, almost as large as, or even larger than the country-effect, but increases the incidence 
of similar votes between two MEPs with approximately 7,4 percent. All in all, career background 
significantly affects the voting behaviour of MEPs through the content of their votes and even to 
a greater extent through whether they vote. 
The statistical significant and large effect of career background on voting participation is 
in line with the theoretical work of Barber (1965) and Ehrenhalt (1992) and it strengthens the 
existing empirical findings by Scully (2005) and Hoyland, Hobolt and Hix, (2014). However, the 
finding that MEPs that consider the EP to be a retirement home are not the least likely to 
participate in parliamentary votes was initially not anticipated. This study shows that the 
domestic careerist career background is the least likely to participate in roll-call votes. This is 
likely to be explained by considering the priorities of the MEPs within this career type. These 
parliamentarians are assumed to aspire a lengthy career in domestic politics, and might therefore 
spend a lot more time in their home country instead of Strasbourg and Brussels, building a strong 
network and preparing their future career. This study might therefore indicate that these activities 
lead to more absences than the indifference of MEPs that are serving their time in the EP after a 
lengthy political career in domestic politics.  
The statistical significant finding of the career-effect related to the extent in which MEPs 
tend to vote alongside each other largely confirm the theoretical work with regard to the 
importance of career ambition on legislative behaviour by Herrick and Moore (1993) on the US 
Congress and Scarrow (1997) and Daniel (2015) on the EP. While ambition is only in part a 
criterion in determining the career type of an MEP, Scully (2005) and Farrel (2003) already 
indicated that the effect stemming from the length of tenure is only marginal at most. 
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Although the significant effect of career background on voting behaviour was 
hypothesized, the relatively high magnitude of that effect was initially not expected. Our second 
multilevel mixed regression model showed that the effect of the career type even exceeds the 
impact of membership in certain EPGs on voting behaviour, whilst EPG is one of the three main 
indicators of voting behaviour within the EP. The results of this study thus suggest that career 
background might be considered to be a fourth main driver of MEP voting behaviour, but further 
research is needed in order to confirm this suggestion.  
When interpreting the results of this study, it is important to take into account the fact 
that the dataset used to test the third hypothesis is inflated. Albeit it was in part corrected for by 
using a mixed model with random effect variables, it might still be the case that the standard 
deviations of the variables in the model are underestimated. Regarding both analyses, it is also 
important to take into account that voting behaviour was conceptualized using roll-call votes. 
While most studies researching voting behaviour use data on this particular kind of voting 
behaviour, these votes provide a biased sample of all votes (Hix 2002). Roll-call votes tend to be 
called by EPGs or large national delegations, mostly to either make their position public, 
embarrass other parties or as a tool to keep their members in check (Corbett, Jacobs & 
Shackleton, 2000). However, due to our specific hypotheses and controls, this should not pose a 
significant problem regarding the core findings. 
In order to ensure the generalizability of the findings, future research could replicate this 
study using data on other waves of the EP in order to strengthen these results. These findings can 
be used to argue the importance of political career backgrounds and warrant further and more 
extensive research on the various forms of political behaviour which it affects. The findings on 
participation can also be used to argue in favour of making the EP more attractive career-wise, in 
order to increase the participation rates within the EP and perhaps increase the effectiveness of 
the institution. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Home Country of MEPs in EP6 
 Frequency Percent 
Country Austria 18 2,1 
Belgium 25 2,9 
Bulgaria 26 3,0 
Cyprus 6 ,7 
Czech 23 2,6 
Denmark 18 2,1 
Estonia 7 ,8 
Finland 16 1,8 
France 87 9,9 
Germany 102 11,6 
Greece 30 3,4 
Hungary 26 3,0 
Ireland 14 1,6 
Italy 109 12,4 
Latvia 8 ,9 
Lithuania 12 1,4 
Luxembourg 6 ,7 
Malta 6 ,7 
Netherlands 31 3,5 
Poland 60 6,8 
Portugal 25 2,9 
Romania 39 4,5 
Slovakia 13 1,5 
Slovenia 7 ,8 
Spain 57 6,5 
Sweden 22 2,5 
UK 83 9,5 
Total 876 100,0 
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Table A2: Distribution of MEPs in EPGs during EP6 
 Frequency Percent 
EPG 
 
Christian Democratic 331 37,8 
Social Democratic 242 27,6 
Liberal 110 12,6 
Green 41 4,7 
Far Left 43 4,9 
Eurosceptic 33 3,8 
National Conservative 45 5,1 
Non Inscrit 31 3,5 
Total 876 100,0 
 
 
Table A3: Gender Distribution of MEPs in EP6 
 Frequency Percent 
Gender Male 610 69,6 
Female 266 30,4 
Total 876 100,0 
 
 
Table A4:  Descriptives of the Age of MEPs in EP6 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. 
Age Difference  876 55,49 10,159 26 85 
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Table A5: Descriptives of the Dyadic Control Variables Party Match, Gender Match and 
Country Match 
 Frequency Percent 
Party Match No match 289773 75,6 
Match 93477 24,4 
Total 383250 100,0 
Gender Match No match 162260 42,3 
Match 220990 57,7 
Total 383250 100,0 
Country Match No match 357552 93,3 
Match 25698 6,7 
Total 383250 100,0 
 
 
 
 
Table A6:  Descriptives of the Dyadic Control Variable Age Difference 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. 
Age Difference  357552 11,45 8,67 0 59 
 
Table A7:  Mean Percentage of Participation per Career Type 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. 
Political dead-end  120 59,66 25,99 0,26 99,73 
Domestic careerist  137 41,74 28,85 0 94,79 
European careerist  172 79,22 13,78 15,03 99,55 
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Table A8: ANCOVA Tests of Between Subjects Effects on Voting Participation Percentage 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
Intercept 26250,171 1 26250,171 64,822*** 
Career Type 53365,395 2 26682,697 65,890*** 
EPG 6169,548 7 881,364 2,176* 
Gender 1076,159 1 1076,159 2,657 
Country 55961,133 26 2152,351 5,315*** 
Age 2339,864 1 2339,864 5,778 
Error 158338,279 391 404,957  
Total 333988,415 428   
a. R Squared = ,526 (Adjusted R Squared = ,481) 
***
p < 0.001, 
**
p < 0.01, 
*
p < 0.05 
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Table A9: Multilevel Linear Regression Models of Impact on Vote Match 
  Model 1 Model 2 
(Intercept) 32,59*** 32,55
*** 
 
(0.35) (0,35) 
Career Type Match 7,36*** 7,37
*** 
 
(0,10) (0,10) 
Country Match 7,93*** 5,61
*** 
 
(0.15) (0,15) 
Gender Match 0,40*** 0,38
*** 
 
(0.10) (0,10) 
Party Match 8,13***  
 
(0,10)  
Dyadic EPG (Ref. = No Party Match)   
 Christian Democratic  8,75
*** 
  (0,17) 
 Social Democratic  7,85
*** 
  (0,20) 
 Liberal  3,48
*** 
  (0,36) 
 Green  30,82
*** 
  (0,95) 
 Far Left  14,55
*** 
  (1,05) 
 Eurosceptic  8,03
*** 
  (1,02) 
 National Conservative  0,95 
  (0,90) 
 Non Inscrit   9,39
*** 
  (1,41) 
Age Difference -0.02** -0,02
** 
 
(0,01) (0,01) 
Log Likelihood -507389,65 -506962,61 
Num. obs. 124080 124080 
Num. groups: MEP 1 873 873 
Num. groups: MEP 2 428 428 
Variance: MEP 1 (Intercept) 47,67 48,68 
Variance: MEP 2 (Intercept) 19,65 20,29 
Variance: Residual 201,87 200,45 
 
 
Note: Multilevel linear regression coefficients with standard errors between brackets. The MEPs in the dyad used as 
reference for both models are the same age and differ in career type, country, gender and party. 
***
p < 0.001, 
**
p < 0.01, 
*
p < 0.05 
